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I. INTRODUCTION
Prisoners and their keepers come by their relationship in a singular
way and we might easily suppose that this relationship has never been
free of conflict. The agility of societies in this regard has not been in
resolving the conflict amicably, but merely in isolating it. Centuries ago,
societies relegated the mad and the criminal to ships where they endured
the world with their masters at the helm-ships of fools adrift off the
coasts of their countries.' Little is known about life on these cruises,
but it is easy to conjure, for example, that the isolation of being at sea
and the attendant diffidence of the mainland society promoted the
madness of the criminally insane and the impunity of the guards. While
not necessarily unusual at those times, the sadistic atmosphere of these
ships surely was cruel. That we never learned of conflict on these ships,
or that its quelling was little publicized, does not free us to conclude
that harmony was the essential mode of the community on these ships.
The methods of asylum and imprisonment changed over centuries,
and eventually the criminal and the dangerous harbored back on land.
The concepts of the prison, the penitentiary, and the gaol supplanted
ships as the dominant method of isolating criminals.2 Although one might
argue forever the causes of this evolution, to call the process reform is
optimistic and probably disingenuous. The criminal and the insane now
resided nearby, or at least on the mainland of their countries, but their
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1. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 257-92
(1979). See also F. WISE, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF
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countrymen remained insulated from the world of prisoners. It is not
merely sentimental to observe that the imperial walls that circumscribe
the archetypal prisons in this country serve as much to keep people out
as to keep them in. And of course it is more common to see the inmates
climbing over to get out than it is to observe a free man vaulting his
way inside.
Inside prisons, a disparity in power relations inevitably prevailed and
dispute resolution took on a particularly primitive cast when parties
were of unequal strength. The society's psychological characterization
of prisoners, and the derivative paranoia, permitted the ceding to the
keepers of a breadth of unaccountability essentially incompatible with
democratic rule, open societies, and accountable government? A perhaps
trivial but ultimately telling reflection of the separation between gov-
ernment and prisoners is the almost universal principle that, upon
conviction, convicts lose their most basic civil right-the right to vote."
Although the rationale for this principle is worth exploring, since it
appears to yield some internal contradictions, such exploration is beyond
the scope of this Article. It is worth observing here, however, that the
denial of prisoners' right to vote is a necessary political and psychological
corollary of the vast deference that our society traditionally has granted
to prison administrators. Only if the people over whom these adminis-
trators lord their powers and prerogatives are not citizens, or part of
the polity, can this unhindered power be reconciled with any plausible
theory of democracy.
Thus, prisoners enter the class of the politically powerless, and they
do so in a manner that, in many respects, makes them more pariahs
than virtually any other class. It was perhaps this uniform exclusion
from the core political processes of the society that, in turn, gave rise
to an ultimately unsupportable contradiction. Under the fundamental
theories of government that suffuse the United States Constitution, the
legislative and executive branches are intended to be responsive to the
wishes of the electorate, as expressed through the essential processes of
3. The United States Supreme Court stated in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974), that "the press and the general public are accorded full opportunities to observe
prison conditions." Id. at 830. Pell appeared to suggest that any blanket restriction on
public access to information about public officials would violate the first amendment
rights of both the press and the public. But in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1
(1978), the Court held that the press had no special right of access beyond that accorded
the general public, even if the public was denied access. The majority in Houchins held
that "the media have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond
that afforded the general public." Id. at 11. See generally Shattuck & Byers, An
Equalitarian Interpretation of the First Amendment, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 377,
391-95 (1981).
4. For a detailed analysis of statutory and constitutional disfranchisement provisions,
see D. RUDENSTINE, THE RIGHTS OF EX-OFFENDERS 159-70 app. (1979).
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government. Where, for one reason or another, those branches are not,
or can not be, responsive to the legitimate concerns of a class, that
class is afforded relief and protection by the judiciary.' The insupportable
contradiction in our past is that while states were disenfranchising
convicts, thereby shutting prisoners out of the political process, courts
where articulating a hands-off policy that sheltered prisons from any
public inquiry and relegated prisoners to the most abject isolation within
a professedly democratic society.
This policy of deference and inattention may be a measure of how
deeply entrenched the idea of prison as asylum is in the American
ethos. This history is familiar, although its actual theoretical basis has
not really been explored. In simple terms relevant to this Article, it is
perhaps sufficient to observe that the conflicts inside prison walls were
not thought to be cognizable in a court of law.6 A hands-off policy
ultimately reflects a judgment that the clashing disharmony of prisons
should be resolved by other-than-judicial means. It is conceivable that
the governing political ideal was to permit the conflicts to be resolved
naturally, according to the established modes of power and control.
In any event, for interesting but presently irrelevant reasons, courts
ultimately parted this veil of neglect.7 This development has meaning
5. The judiciary has long been viewed as the haven for the outcast, the victimized
and the powerless. As Justice Black stated in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940),
"[u]nder our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as havens
of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnum-
bered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."
Id. at 241.
6. For cases upholding the "hands-off" policy, see, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d
771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954); In re Taylor, 187 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 829 (1951); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951); Sturm v. McGrath,
177 F.2d 472 (10th Cir. 1949); Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 888 (1950); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948); Curtis v.
Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954, United States ex rel. Collins v. Heinze,
219 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1955); Henson v. Welch, 199 F.2d 367 (4th. Cir. 1952); Adams
v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952);
Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th
Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. Vraniak v. Randolph, 161 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ill. 1958);
Peretz v. Humphrey, 86 F. Supp. 705 (M.D. Pa. 1949); Feyerchak v. Hiatt, 7 F.R.D.
726 (M.D. Pa. 1948). See generally FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 31 (1961)
(origin of the term "hands-off"); Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique
of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 509 (1963).
7. One of the earliest decisions to retreat from the "hands-off" doctrine was Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941) (invalidation of prison regulation requiring the screening
of petitions for habeas corpus by prison officials). The use of § 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, rather than the traditional use of habeas corpus, was first upheld in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974)
("[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned
for crime."). See generally Comment, Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role
of the Federal Judiciary in State Prison Reform, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 31, 32-39 (1976).
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in a wide variety of spheres, but, for the present purpose, let us say
simply that these decisions heralded a self-conscious decision on the
part of judges that the conflicts inside prison walls would be brought
into the society's primary forum for public dispute resolution-the federal
courts.
I will not discuss in this Article the role of litigation in resolving
the conflicts that arise between prisoners and their keepers. Plainly,
without this litigation, much of the conflict would have remained out
of sight in American society. Experience tells us that this means only
that the prevailing power relationships in prison will operate to settle
disputes.! This of course does not mean that all prisoners are victimized
or that all administrators or guards prevail. The internal power structures
of a prison are considerably more complex than that, and in any event,
inmates have their own fights with one another. In the absence of federal
court intervention, it is almost axiomatic that struggles between prisoners
are left to the prisoners to resolve among themselves.
II. THE SPECIAL MASTER:
COPING WITH NONCOMPLIANCE
Litigation has not solved all of the conflicts that arise between
prisoners and their keepers, not even when a court order mandating
reform has been entered. The reasons for this deficiency are myriad.
Court orders frequently are vague; often they are abstract; and they
typically rely on formulae that have meaning in the parlance of law,
but which founder ultimately when used to guide actual human conduct.
It may finally be true that federal judges are ill-equipped to prescribe
the daily regimens for an institution as febrile and complex as a prison.
In any event, let us posit that court orders, on their own, have not
solved the problems that occasioned, after so long, the entree of federal
courts into this strange world of prison life.
After ten years of court orders being entered, contested, ignored, and
sporadically enforced with uneven results, a new turn in the field was
taken by the incorporation into the area of an old idea-the special
master. For it turned out that in the process of entering federal court
decrees requiring the achievement and maintenance of constitutional
conditions in prisons, those involved in the process came to see they
had embarked upon a particularly complex and unwieldy enterprise.9
Lengthy detailed mandatory injunctions, requiring vigilant monitoring
8. See generally A. SAMPLE, RACEHOSS: BIG EMMA'S BoY 157 (1984).
9. Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL. L.
REV. 419 (1979).
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and enforcement in an institution remote from the known norms of a
society and accustomed to its almost gothic isolation, did not yield to
the established processes of formal adjudication in federal courts. Over
time, judges and litigators found that the resolution in the courtroom
did not translate automatically, and often not at all, into actual sub-
stantive change upon which a final laurel of constitutionality might be
rested. As this knowledge evolved, the law, in its internal organic genius,
searched out from its own legacy a solution at once ancient and modern-
the mechanism of the special master.
A. The Obdurate Defendant and the Special Master: Dispelling Prev-
alent Caricatures
The use of special masters in institutional reform litigation is by now
a sufficiently acknowledged curiosity that it has its own literature, and
within that literature we can detect the dialectics of orthodoxy, heretical
critiques, revisionism, and synthesis (historical and ahistorical). 0 Because
of this spate of attention, the general topic of the role of special masters
in dispute resolution is both too tired and too broad for me to write
about. I want instead to address an important sub-theme. Really, what
I have in mind is the dismantling of a prevalent caricature.
One of the dominant themes in the literature of prison reform is the
image of the intransigent prison administrator at war with the activist
judge, the cadre of legal aid lawyers toiling at the public till, and the
outsider savant. Ultimately, this portrait, which has much truth to it,
reduces to a core image: the special master forging a way through
otherwise intractable obstacles to compliance. I personally have heard
this image voiced many times, in a million ways. In simple terms, the
common question is how a special master deals with the myriad of
obstacles which impede his work. This question rests on a background
assumption of obdurate defendants. Yet when I reflect on personal
experience, I find nothing to support that image.
In fact, I cannot speak about the classic perception of intransigent
defendants and corrections professionals who have staked their future
on obdurate defiance of a lawful court order. In this regard, it seems
10. Id.; Berger, Away From the Court House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a
Special Master, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 707 (1978); Special Project, The Remedial Process
in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 784 (1978); Dobray, The Role of
Masters in Court Ordered Institutional Reform, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 581 (1982); Brakel,
Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 A.F.B. RES. J. 543; Comment, Equitable
Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiverships to Implement Large
Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 116; Note, "Mastering" Intervention in
Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979); Note, Masters and Magistrates in the Federal Courts,
88 HARV. L. REv. 779 (1975). See generally J. DIIULIO. GOVERNING PRISONS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987).
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to me that the classic image of intransigence-the image of the Governor
standing in the schoolhouse door, inviting the application of federal
force as an agent for change-no longer has application in the remedial
phase of prison reform. I understand that in this regard my experience
has been limited, and perhaps is idiosyncratic. I acknowledge the pos-
sibility that presently there are in the country administrators who would
resist to the fullest extent of their abilities the imposition of court
ordered reform." I simply have not had personal experience with this
kind of conduct. I am willing to assert that I believe my experience in
this regard is representative, and that indeed the image of Neanderthal
prison officials simply is one that has no currency. In large measure
this significant and heartening progress is the result of the development
of standards within the profession that provide a benchmark for profes-
sional personnel in their dealings with prisoners, fellow staff, and other
public officials. 12 1 do not mean to gainsay the role prison litigation has
played in the reform of prisoners. Yet, I do not believe I am being
Pollyannaish in concluding that present day prison litigation serves not
so much to club persistently wicked administrators into conforming their
conduct with the mandates of the Constitution, as it serves to provide
a lever for all interested people to use in obtaining the funds, personnel,
and resources required to maintain a Constitutional prison. 3
11. I acknowledge that resistance to court ordered reform is prevalent. This resistance
is couched in both philosophical and pragmatic terms. For an example of what I term
philosophical resistance, see Support for a Revised Federal Policy on Consent Decrees
Affecting the States, Proposed W. Governors Resolution., July 7, 1987. An example of
pragmatic resistance to federal reform is the Texas Department of Corrections' response
to Judge Justice's order prohibiting the use of building tenders for custodial purposes.
See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. 2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1982).
12. See generally ABA Comm. on Correctional Facilities and Services and Council
of State Gov'ts, COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS
(2d ed. 1975) (comprehensive compilation of corrections standards). See also AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL ASS'N. MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS (1966) (comprehensive
survey of standards of correctional institutions conducted by the American Correctional
Association); George, The Case for Correctional Accreditation, in PRISONER'S RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK (1985) (cataloging various collections of prisoners' rights standards); ABA
Section of Criminal Justice, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STANDARDS AND GOALS OF THE
NATL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS WITH STANDARDS FOR
CRIM. JUST. OF THE ABA (1974) (comparative analysis of the NAC and ABA correctional
standards).
13. Increasingly, federal appellate court decisions in the area of prison law are being
resolved on eleventh amendment grounds relating to the power of federal courts to compel
state legislatures to spend money. See, e.g., Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570 (9th
Cir. 1983). Ultimately, the eleventh amendment may stand as the most serious impediment
to the preeminence of the Constitution in the history of constitutional adjudication. A
prisoner's rights mean little, if anything at all, if they cannot be enforced, where enforcement
is dependent upon political expenditures. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), affd on rehearing, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Lelsz v. Kavanagh,
824 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1987).
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B. The Underlying Rationale for the Special Mastership
I do not agree that the classic image of confrontational resistance is
a primary foundation supporting the legitimacy of special masterships
in a prison context.' 4 The underlying rationale for masterships exists
independent of that image. This rationale is not confuted, even if we
have moved into a time when the wardens and department directors
have moved from the jailhouse door to the no less embattled arenas of
state legislatures.
It is here that the emerging dilemmas of the criminal justice system
lodge and threaten to lurk unsolved. The expansion of crimes defined
in state law, the proliferation of task force prosecutions, the consequent
burdening of criminal court dockets, resulting plea bargains and deter-
minate sentencing combine uneasily in exerting a range of conflicting
pressures on limited state resources. How these pressures will be relieved
is not clear. That prisons will bear a disproportionate share of the
responsibility, with insufficient resources, can reasonably be predicted.
Having never encountered directly obdurate defendants intent on
defeating the application of court orders to their institutions, I am
reluctant to speculate on how a special master might properly deal with
such a situation. However, I suppose that if faced with that problem,
a special master would rely on a number of the items that have been
identified in the literature: the authority to pursue specific personnel
actions against deliberately noncompliant state employees 5 and, ulti-
mately, the threat of harsh, direct court action in the form of criminal
or civil findings of contempt.' 6 In such a situation, a master of unwavering
14. Prolonged noncompliance should not be viewed as a necessary but insufficient
predicate for the appointment of a special master. A number of compelling reasons exist
for appointing a special master prior to reaching a period of prolonged noncompliance.
See generally Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institution Reform Litigation, 10 U. TOL.
L. REv. 419 (arguing that rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with its
requirement of "exceptional condition" is not the sole authority for the appointment of
a master). But see Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that federal
courts should defer to the policy choices made by prison officials); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979) (stating that simply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional
rights does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and limitations).
15. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Wittenberg, 73
F.R.D. 82 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Guthrie v. Evans, 93 F.R.D. 390 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
16. The scope of the special master's authority regarding concept sanctlons and
injunctions is indeterminate. Courts delegating authority to special masters to recommend
contempt sanctions include NLRB v. Local 282, 428 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1970); Helen
Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 247 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Standard Trouser
Co., 162 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1947). Cases giving the special master narrower authority
limited to fact finding relating to noncompliance and contempt include Heywood-Wakefield
Co. v. Frank & Son, Inc., 98 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1938); United States v. International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 334 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Staley
Elevator Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 35 F. Supp. 778 (N.J. 1940).
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character, impeccable credentials, strict determination, and flexibility
would be desirable.
I do not mean to give short shrift to the idea of a special master
battering defendants into compliance. I sincerely believe, however, that
the days when this image has any application are over. If they are not,
and I have misjudged the recent history of corrections, then I am
confident nonetheless that I have judged correctly the fact that I have
nothing meaningful to contribute on this issue, and I leave further
discussion of it to special masters in whose work active resistance has
been a real and current danger.
All of this is not to say that in my experience I have encountered
only correctional administrators and line staff who, when presented with
court ordered mandates with respect to conditions of confinement, have
proceeded with the implementation of those reforms promptly and
successfully. Obviously, were such the case, there would have been no
call for the services of a special master. For although I do not see
deliberate noncompliance to be a necessary predicate for the appointment
of a special master, I do not doubt that problems associated with
compliance are such a predicate. 7 It is simply a matter of the genesis
of those difficulties, and how it relates to the state of mind of persons
charged with implementing the court order, as well as the conception
of the case brought to litigants by the special master that necessitate
the services of a special master.
III. OBTRUSIVE VS. UNOBTRUSIVE SPECIAL MASTERS
A. The "Wily Warden" and the "Dumbfounded Director"
In this regard, a useful model constructed by Alan Dershowitz for
pedagogical purposes with respect to the development of the law of
17. Federal courts traditionally have used masters in a wide variety of factual settings
where the judgment was singularly difficult to enforce in traditional legal matters. See,
e.g., Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927) (patent infringement); Smith
v. Brown, 3 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1925) (suit to cancel a property deed); Magnaleasing,
Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 428 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd per curiam, 563
F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1977) (leasing dispute); Investment Fund Corp. v. Bomar, 303 F.2d
592 (5th Cir. 1962) (bankruptcy proceeding); United States v. 3,065.94 Acres of Land,
187 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (eminent domain). For a discussion of the traditional
use of special masters, see Kaufman, Masters in Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 452 (1958); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue,
50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297 (1975). In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1959),
the Court upheld the appointment by a federal judge of a special master to make factual
findings on the ground that the inherent intricacy of fact finding in federal antitrust
actions warranted such an appointment. See also Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972);
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920); McCullough v. Cosgrave, 309 U.S. 634 (1940).
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search and seizure under the fourth amendment and the application of
the exclusionary rule is applicable. 18 Mr. Dershowitz asserted at the
outset of the discussion that one's view of the fourth amendment, and
concept of the appropriate scope of the exclusionary rule, depends on
one's vision of the character of law enforcement officials. Succinctly
stated, Mr. Dershowitz argued that the prevailing conceptions as reflected
in fourth amendment law are that of the calculating cop on the one
hand, and the bumbling constable on the other. The point is that an
individual's view of the scope of the fourth amendment, and the propriety
of the application of the remedy of the exclusionary rule depends on
whether the individual thinks police misconduct is generated by cunning
or ineptitude. I suggest this dichotomy, as well as its implications, are
relevant to the consideration of the role of the special master in dealing
with problems associated with the implementation of court decrees in
prisons. Plainly, a mediator's conception of his role as it relates to his
dealings with correctional administrators, line officers, inmates, and
counsel is critical.19 I therefore wish to propose a model similar to that
used by Mr. Dershowitz. I suggest that one's concept of the role of the
special master, and the development of techniques to deal with problems
of compliance, depend on whether one carries to the prison the image
of, on one hand, the wily warden and, on the other hand, the dumbfounded
afd deprived director. 20
When a special master enters a case, he is bound to confront problems
with compliance: areas of prison life where it is evident to the trained
eye that the mandates of the court's order have not been implemented
and where many a mile must be trod before compliance is achieved. I
suggest it is critical at that point for the special master to clarify whether
noncompliance is the result of intentional perfidy (the wily warden) or
whether it is the result of a lack of skill, resources, training and energy.
In this regard, I plainly prefer, and I suggest to you as an appropriate
response, the image of the dumbfounded director-the corrections profes-
sional who lacks, for perhaps a wide variety of reasons, the wherewithal
to achieve compliance without financial assistance.21 If that image is
18. Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor
and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1221 (1971).
19. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETrING TO YES 19-27 (1981).
20. A judge's view of prison officials correlates to some extent with whether the court
will defer to them. Some Fifth Circuit opinions view administrators as incompetent and
therefore uphold expansive orders. Other Fifth Circuit opinions indicate greater faith in
prison officials and consequently frown on expansive orders. Compare, e.g., Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (implementation of broad remedial measures in state prison
is within the jurisdiction of the district court) with Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th
Cir. 1982) (court's task is limited to protecting inmates' constitutional rights and does
not embrace superintending prison administration).
21. The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) of the United States Department of
Justice reports a clear growth trend in corrections expenditures. The results of an NIC
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accepted, and I want to say I very much believe it is the norm at
present, I believe it generates certain imperatives with respect to the
role of the special master in overcoming obstacles to compliance.
First let me say that this image argues for the primacy of staffing
and training in the range of concerns to be addressed by a special
master. Specifically, the special master must attend in great detail to
the issue of staffing, in terms of adequate numbers of officers and
appropriate post orders delegating specific tasks to those officers. Second,
the special master must vigilantly evaluate the quality of the training
program, and ensure that the most advanced professional training stand-
ards are adhered to at the institutional and departmental levels. Training
in this context should be afforded the broadest possible definition, and
should include inculcation in a broad variety of personal skills. Moreover,
staff must achieve thorough familiarity with the specific requirements
of the court's order as well as the broader legal regime applicable to
prisons and jails.
With good, professionally trained, and conscientiously supervised staff,
a prison can be run in a humane, safe manner. At that point I believe
adherence to all specific provisions of a court decree is a task easily
achieved. In contrast, a poorly selected, inadequately trained, and un-
supervised staff will breed discontent and dissension in an inmate pop-
ulation which, in all superficial aspects, is provided with idyllic conditions.
Asserting this view does not imply the futility of the movement within
corrections toward professional standards. Nor does it contest the es-
tablishment of objective procedures as the best available guaranty against
abuse inside institutions. Obviously, the assumption that a professionally
trained staff will be able to adhere to a court decree is right, for it
speaks the truism that established, mandatory procedures form the best
protection for the powerless against the whims of dictators and zealots.
At the same time, prisons and jails are intensely personal places. The
quality of the relationship between an inmate and a staff member,
whether it be on an issue of constitutional dimension such as discipline,
survey show that during a twelve-year period from 1970 to 1982 the proportion of state
operational expenditures budgeted for corrections increased in each of the fifty states.
Costs of state correctional services increased from $931.4 million in 1970 to $6.1 billion
in 1982. Total state expenditures tripled over the twelve-year period; expenditures for
corrections increased by six times. Two factors contributed to the increased spending for
corrections at the state level. The first is the unprecedented growth of the correctional
workload, including a greatly increased rate of incarceration of offenders and a growth
in probation and parole caseloads. The second factor in the growth in state spending for
corrections is inflation, which has significantly driven up costs since 1970. The NIC survey
concluded that "[w]ith the continuing expansion of correctional facilities due to growing
inmate populations, it is likely that correctional services will continue in the future to
absorb increasing proportions of state revenues. NATIONAL INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUST., STATE EXPENDITURES FOR CORRECTIONS, 1970-1982/83 (Dec.
1983).
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or an administrative matter concerning the loss of an inmate's family
picture, says a great deal about the quality of our prisons and jails,
and the quality of our society.22
These images, of staff inmate dealings suggest a central problem in
the special master's work, and in the effort of establishing constitutional
conditions. The issue of deprivation of inmate access to legal materials
is of constitutional dimension, and properly so. In contrast, if an inmate
loses his family pictures through a careless staff search or because his
private possessions are not truly private, the loss probably does not reach
a constitutional level. Yet one must question which deprivation works
a more painful or enduring hardship on an inmate.
B. The Unobtrusive Special Mastership
Second, the image of the dumbfounded director generates another
imperative fundamentally important to the conception of a master in
how he deals with prisoners' problems: be as unobtrusive as possible.
Plainly, a special master must have full and unfettered access to the
institution, including all personnel and records. Such access has little
to do with the intrusive character of the mastership. Michael Millemann
proposes that we should be open in our advocacy of strong, intrusive
masterships; 23 1 strongly disagree. Intrusiveness is measured in the degree
to which the special master arrogates to himself the task of making
fundamental decisions in the administration of the jail, on critical security
issues, or less important, administrative matters.24 In this sense, a mas-
tership that is intrusive is one designed to fail. We must be mindful
always that a special mastership is something quite different from a
receivership, and when we begin to talk about special masters imple-
menting the order, or directing compliance, or ensuring conformity with
the order, I believe we have entered the realm of receiverships. A
receivership is the result, in many cases, of a mastership that has failed.
In other words, a case that has on its record such a breadth of deliberate
noncompliance and failed resolutions almost necessarily in these days
is one in which the master's efforts have been unsuccessful. A mastership
properly structured and effectively carried out will avoid the need for
intrusiveness, and will end the case long before there is justification for
the appointment of a receiver.
22. For a classic description of the nexus between the quality of prisons and the
quality of society, see generally A. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (1941).
23. See Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L.
REV. 795 (1969).
24. Some orders are so expansive that they in effect establish a receivership. For an
example of an extreme special mastership, see Bronson v. Winters, No. 78807 (Super.
Ct., Santa Clara, Cal. June 8, 1983). An example of an intermediate order is found in
Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82 (N.D. Ohio 1976). A non-intrusive order can be found
in Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
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Of course, a special master in the course of his dealings with prison
administrators will encounter strong resistance to certain changes, and
at a minimum will encounter situations in which direct and immediate
implementation of court ordered reforms simply will not be possible.
These problems will often be generated by the specific individual whose
presence in the correctional hierarchy serves in one way or another to
obscure or divert the movement toward compliance. In this regard, the
special master should attempt to the utmost extent possible to preserve
the prevailing correctional administration, and to work with the admin-
istration in the implementation of reform. Only at the point the special
master becomes convinced that under no circumstances can compliance
with the order be achieved with present personnel should the special
master change his course in this regard. The appropriate response at
that time is to go directly to the appointing authority-the governor or
the sheriff-and to convey to that person directly the master's impressions
about the quality of leadership in the department. Hopefully the ap-
pointing authority will meet the representations of the special master
with appropriate personnel action. If that does not happen, and the
special master therefore concludes that the present correctional admin-
istration cannot, and will not, achieve compliance, I suggest that perhaps
the grounds for an intrusive mastership---a receivership-have been laid.
Short of that eventuality, however, nonintrusiveness is the hallmark
of a successful master. In the end, the administrators of the prison or
jail will run the institution. When the master is gone, at the end of the
day, at the end of a week-long visit, or at the end of the mastership
itself, the people the master leaves behind in positions of authority will
run the institution. That is how it should be. If I am right in asserting
that ill-intentioned administrators are passe, then I suggest special mas-
terships have every chance of being successful if they preserve, as
inviolate as possible, the discretion of correctional administrators to
make fundamental decisions about the institution. In most respects the
special master's task is neither to run the prison, nor to arrogate the
prerogatives of power. Rather the special master should work at re-
trofitting an administration, with an abundance of resources, supplied
by virtue of the court order, which, if properly parlayed, can be used
to run a constitutional and sane prison. A court ordered reform may
provide the correctional administrator with a new physical plant, or at
a minimum, a greatly renovated and improved facility. The administrator
may have a new and abundant staffing complement that will permit
the assignment of correctional officers to posts not previously present
in the staffing plan, but required for safe and lawful operation of a
facility. A new training regime to provide skills in a variety of critical
areas may be in place. A court ordered reform may precipitate the
development of new policies and procedures affecting fundamental core
operations of the facility.
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In such a context, a warden or jail director may be baffled, embar-
rassed, and paralyzed in the face of plenty. Moreover, the warden may
be accustomed to a period of crisis management when he attempted to
run the prison with an inadequate staff. While this crisis may have
been handled with great dexterity and skill, it is probably part of a
mental attitude that the changes I have mentioned rendered outmoded
and perhaps counter-productive. We must acknowledge that there are
aspects of crisis management that appeal to certain human instincts.
As long as one perceives himself to be at the center of a critical and
ongoing drama, it is not likely that role will be happily relinquished,
unless self-enhancing aspects of the role can be replicated in another
role.
In this regard, the special master should not overlook the degree of
fear generated by unfamiliarity. Although crisis management may have
about it an aura of danger, it may be more comfortable than a new
administrative activity. And to the extent that unfamiliarity changes
the warden's perception of his role, it may generate fear, some of it
articulable, some of it not. What is most telling about this prospective
rearrangement is that the warden or jail director may have a large
number of new and different tasks to carry out as part of the daily
conduct of his role. The special master should work closely with the
warden in this regard, not making the decisions, but helping with the
adjustment by going through new movements with the warden, answering
questions, and assisting in the acquisition of new skills.
To be successful in this endeavor, the special master must have the
trust and confidence of the administrator with which he deals. Much
of the success of the special master depends on the quality of the
relationship he has developed with the warden. If that relationship is
sound, and if it has the appropriate elements of trust, confidence, and
respect, the task of what I have called retrofitting will be accomplished,
and it will improve the quality of the jail administration beyond measure.
I am speaking here of developing a sense of the heightened pleasures
of professionalism in the warden or jail director.
IV. THE INTERNAL COMPLIANCE COORDINATOR
Having abjured the image of the wily warden, and having developed
thoughts on the imperatives generated by the image of the dumbfounded
director, let me speak about what I believe to be a critical element in
the special master's and the warden's efforts to achieve compliance. My
experience has led me to conclude that an absolutely essential ingredient
in the compliance movement is the appointment by corrections depart-
ments or sheriffs departments of an internal compliance coordinator,
373
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
devoted solely to the task of achieving and maintaining compliance with
the court's order. Frequently, in the early phases of the mastership,
department directors will avow to the special master that the governing
intent of his administration will be to achieve compliance with the order.
These assurances are heartening to be sure, but they should not be
taken at face value, for they will, without more, lead to certain failure.
This problem is not caused by any deficiency in the good faith expressed,
or that such expressions are disingenuous. Rather, it simply is beyond
the ability of most correctional administrators to run their department,
and at the same time oversee, direct, and maintain compliance with
the court order. That is just too much for one person to do.
A correctional administrator is responsible for the day-to-day operation
of his department. This means, in turn, that he will be confronted with
escapes, legislative dealings, budget crunches, correctional officer strikes,
and a variety of other administrative nightmares that arise with startling
but predictable frequency. Moreover, the orthodox response to these
administrative crises may, in fundamental but not fatal ways, run afoul
of the internal effort toward compliance instigated as a result of the
court order. Although ultimately the mandates of correctional admin-
istration and the directives of the order may have to be compromised,
neither the internal compliance coordinator nor the correctional admin-
istrator should have the absolute power to determine the moment of
compromise or its form. Either person is poorly positioned to achieve
a compromise grounded in reason and analysis.
I am suggesting here simply that an internal compliance coordinator
should be appointed and his or her charge should be exclusively to
familiarize all people in the department with the terms of the order,
to promote all possible measures to achieve compliance, and when that
state of grace is achieved, to construct internal guards against backsliding
or retrenchment. That of course is a huge task, and it is not one for
everyone, not even everyone devoted to lawful prisons.
Certain characteristics desirable in the internal compliance monitor
can be identified. An internal compliance coordinator should be thor-
oughly knowledgeable in the daily operation of correctional institutions,
as well as certain more general concerns of security, surveillance, and
inmate management that must shape the correctional administrator's
decision. The compliance monitor should have tremendous skills in
motivating and educating other people, and place a great premium on
a sense of humor; she should be tough and an indefatigable worker.
People who combine these skills at their highest level are rare yet a
sincere and devoted effort to identify and obtain the services of a person
with all of these skills in some significant degree will be repaid, many
times in the achievement of compliant conditions in a prompt, effective,
and orderly manner.
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V. OBSTACLES FACED BY THE SPECIAL MASTER
These thoughts on the nature of the special master's relationship with
correctional administrators depart significantly from the prevailing char-
acterization, or perhaps caricature, of correctional administrators that
informs much thought about prison reform. Nonetheless, this relates to
a prevalent obstacle to compliance, because by definition special masters
inherit flawed institutions and are expected to correct them. This task
will be simplified, I believe, if a special master rejects the stereotypes
of resistance and focuses instead on the kinds of problems that are
likely to exist in prisons in the 1980s.
Of course, ill-funded and overworked administrators, unfamiliar with
the legal precepts of the court's order are not the only obstacles a
special master will encounter.
Correctional reform is a difficult task, and because of that fact one
should not be surprised to find difficulties in every quarter. That fact
does not warrant pessimism, although the complexity of some of these
issues may occasion despondency. These unarticulated obstacles to com-
pliance that special masters predictably encounter, perhaps with in-
creasing frequency, arise in the strangest quarters. They constitute,
perhaps, an embroidery of the basic problem of institutional reform.
First, counsel who are unfamiliar with the particular difficulties
associated with class representation in a correctional context can, without
intending to do so, divert the compliance effort in a number of ways.
The problem in this regard will have increasing currency in cases in
which the defendant corrections department is represented by privately
retained counsel unfamiliar with prison litigation and skilled in the
standard techniques of "complex" civil litigation. A principle of these
techniques is the use of delay as an active and pervasive defense strategy,
apart from the protracted time periods inherent in institutional reform.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, combined with grotesquely ov-
ercrowded federal civil dockets, provide litigants with an abundance of
opportunities to delay and frustrate reform simply through the crafty
use of procedural devices. The special master can be of incomparable
help to the court and to the parties in diffusing these delay techniques.
The special master can bring to the case a sense of immediacy, and
can be effective in cutting through delay tactics that skilled litigants
pose. It is worth noting in this regard that one of the primary justifications
for the use of special masters in the pre-trial discovery phase is to
hasten the discovery process, and to shield against the built-in delays
of the discovery process. 25 The special master has a particular obligation
25. See, e.g., Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1986); Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold,
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to counsel and the parties to remain in close contact with all persons
so that they are aware of what is happening, when it is happening, and
how it will affect everyone. Such prompt and regular contacts can be
a successful device in expediting the litigation and in overcoming the
imposition of delay as a defensive tactic.
A. Prison Subclasses
Similarly, plaintiffs' counsel unfamiliar with the peculiar nature of
the class representation in a prison or jail context provides special
masters, and litigants, with a variety of problems. Anyone familiar with
the operation of the prison is aware that the inmate population consists,
in fact, of numerous subpopulations. At the most routine level, prisons
divide themselves among various groups to whom they owe overarching
loyalty as a matter of basic lifestyle.26 At a more dramatic and important
level, groups and gangs form within prisons, and the divisions among
these groups have real meaning with respect to the manner in which
the prison must operate to ensure the safety of all prisoners, as well as
staff members. 27 Finally, the conduct of prisoners within the prison
environment provides classification data to administrators which enables
them to form the bases for classification decisions that separate inmates
from each other, either in general population living units or in various
levels of administrative segregation. 28
These divisions are merely a fact of prison life, but they have
significant import with respect to the way in which plaintiffs' counsel
represents the inmate class in a federal civil action relating to conditions
of confinement and inmate activities at an institution, or, more impor-
tantly, across an entire state system. Although in fact the inmate
population consists of subclasses, the procedural device of subclass
representation is rarely used in prison litigation to ensure that all members
of the inmate population have adequate representation.29 Instead, the
Early Neutral Evaluation, 69 JUDICATURE 279 (1986); Peckman, A Judicial Response
to the Costs of Litigation." Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985). See generally W. BRAZIL,
G. HAZARD & P. RICE, MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS (1983) (collection of articles on the use of special masters in
pretrial and discovery, with an emphasis on the use of special masters in the American
Telephone & Telegraph antitrust case).
26. B. BAGDIHIAN, CAGED: EIGHT PRISONERS AND THEIR KEEPERS at xvii (1976).
27. Krajick, The Menace of the Supergangs, CORRECTIONS MAG., June 1980, at 11.
28. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982). See also AMERICAN COR-
RECTIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 351-65 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Steward v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982); Alexander v. Gino's,
Inc., 621 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1980); Dohner v. McCarthy, 635 F. Supp. 408 (C.D. Cal.
1985); Degidio v. Perpich, 612 F. Supp. 1383 (Minn. 1985); Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith,
541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Glover v. Johnson, 85 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382 (R.I. 1977); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 77 F.R.D.
619 (1976); Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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duty of conscientious representation devolves upon, most frequently, a
single entity, styled "plaintiffs' counsel." Counsel must, during litigation
and negotiations, identify solutions to real problems that, when viewed
at a general level, provide the most favorable form of relief for the
client group and its subgroups. It is impossible to overestimate the
difficulty of this task.
Yet it is possible for plaintiffs' counsel to bear in mind her obligation
to represent an entire prisoner population, and to avoid being captured
by particularly vocal or visible subgroups of that class. In this regard,
it is worth keeping in mind John Conrad's definition of objectives for
a prison: that it be safe, lawful, industrious, and hopeful.30 If plaintiffs'
counsel can keep in mind that four-part mandate, and evaluate class
representation against that backdrop, plaintiffs' counsel will have iden-
tified a workable benchmark for decision making on critical issues.
By way of example, imagine a mediation session between inmates
and prison administrators which involved security measures to be taken
in an administrative segregation housing unit. One might easily imagine
plaintiffs' counsel arguing strenuously and articulately for the imposition
of stringent measures regulating inmate movement, the assignment of
security personnel to the administrative segregation housing unit, training
of staff in security-related activities, and stringent penalties against
inmates who violate disciplinary codes. On the other hand, one can
imagine defendants' counsel arguing against each of these measures.
Representation of a class in this manner is an example of conscientious
class representation. The preservation of internal security to ensure the
safety of the inmate class as a whole, as well as ancillary groups such
as prison administrators and line officers, is an interest to be placed
high on the array of sometimes conflicting and difficult to resolve
interests implicated in the negotiation session I have described.
Issues of this kind are raised in virtually every general conditions
case across the country. It is not clear that they are handled with the
care that we might hope for. In litigation involving San Quentin, the
notorious California prison, there was a significant upheaval when a
court-appointed special master ordered the release of inmates from
administrative segregation following hearings at which he substituted
his judgments for those of the prison administrators. These releases were
accompanied by his apparently blithe acknowledgement that the release
of these inmates would lead to their deaths, or the deaths of others.
Plainly, the special master's actions were insupportable. One must ques-
tion as well the tactics of plaintiffs' counsel who was pressing the issue.
30. J. CONRAD, CRIME AND ITS CORRECTION: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF AT-
TITUDES AND PRAcTIcES 42 (1965).
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This advocacy represents a striking and disheartening example of myopic
class representation and in fact discredits the prisoners' rights movement,
and threatens to provide an enormous amount of potent ammunition to
be used against that movement."' In the context of class representation,
are the lawyers representing the inmate class in that case truly providing
"adequate representation" to the inmates? Even if the class in that case
is limited to inmates housed in administrative segregation, full-tilt ad-
vocacy of a particular individual's release, in the face of convincing
documentation that release of that inmate will lead to his, or other
inmates' harm, has little to do with appropriate adversarial work. The
definition of class representation in this case indicates a crabbed, dan-
gerous, and ultimately unethical discharge of an attorney's responsibility.
No one, absolutely no one, has an interest in the release of a particular
inmate, if, as the special master in that case has been quoted as saying,
it is clear that the inmate's release will result in his, or another inmate's,
certain death.3 2 We all must deplore such actions. Special masters have
an independent obligation, as officers of the court, to ensure that court
orders be applied conscientiously and sanely, with John Conrad's mandate
in mind.
The existence of subclasses of a prisoner population necessarily entails
a situation in which not all inmates will have a shared and undivided
interest in the achievement of all specific measures mandated by a court
order. If in the course of the litigation, there is only one class represented
before the court, this fact of division may create serious problems in
inmate relations, both for the prison administration and for the special
master. Especially in cases when some form of compromise is used to
resolve serious disputes without litigation, the impression is bound to
be prevalent that something dear has been lost; that plaintiffs' counsel,
the special master, and the judge are guilty of dereliction of duty.
In a related vein, it should be acknowledged that the plaintiff class
itself, consisting of prisoners, can present formidable obstacles in the
movement toward compliance with a court order, and in the efforts of
a special master to monitor the state of compliance.
This fact presents a range of possibilities that the parties responsible
for the implementation and oversight of compliance measures must
acknowledge. First, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33
assigns to the judge the task of monitoring, independently of the rep-
31. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1421-22 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
32. This statement was attributed to the Special Master in Toussaint by Defense
counsel in that case, who participated in the Woods Hole Conference on Special Masters,
Woods Hole, Mass., May 1985.
33. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
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resentation of class advocates, the adequacy of any proposed compromise
settlement of class-related issues. Plaintiffs' counsel may have an obli-
gation to maintain an ongoing relationship with her clients, either a
representative group, or selected inmates, or prisoners encountered ran-
domly in the course of prison tours. Lawyers with skill understand this
duty and that the maintenance of good relations between counsel and
the plaintiff class almost certainly will become critical at some advance
stage of the litigation. This reservoir of trust is particularly important
when plaintiffs' counsel has to make difficult settlement decisions about
security-related issues, or is called upon by the exigencies of litigation
to make difficult decisions in trading off between relatively more or
less important aspects of prison life. Plaintiffs' counsel must make her
decisions at that time in a conscientious and professional manner. This
imperative is likely to be lost, however, on inmates who may not bei
and perhaps should not be, particularly clear-sighted about such issues,
layered as they are with nuance.
Obviously, to the degree plaintiffs' counsel successfully discharges
the decision-making duty, and the judge provides a rule 2334 procedure
on settlements that is open and fair, the special master's job will be
easier. Ultimately, however, the special master has his own bridges to
build and cross in his relationships with prisoners, and the path he
constructs will not always assist him .in achieving compliance. Indeed,
as litigation becomes more successful, and the institution is brought
within the ultimate goal of compliance, the stridency and frequency of
inmate complaints tends to increase. This, of course, is understandable.
Inmates who see in the near future an end to litigation, and loss of
their immediate contacts with the court through the auspices of the
special master, have legitimate concerng about the dissolution of the
case. At the same time, certain vocal and powerful inmates may have
mixed a variety of hidden agendas in with their legitimate concerns,
and the special master will not view all of the concerns as valid.
B. The Relationship Between the Special Master and Prisoners
This peculiar and delicate relationship, between the special master
and the prisoners is worthy of careful attention. The special master's
long association with the case, and his perspective on progress made at
the institution are fundamental parts of his role in the latter phase of
the case. From the special master's perspective, inmate complaints about
abhorrent conditions, and deviant, although hidden, practices, can create
frustration and irritation. The special master's ardent and legitimate
attempts to maintain a long and large view of the history of the institution
34. Id.
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can also entail troubling, untold inattention to the intimate particulars
of prison life. Certain aspects of prison life are bound to be unpleasant,
perhaps painful, psychologically threatening, and always dispiriting. The
litigation, of course, will never change these facts, and to a large extent
they are beyond the purview of federal jurisdiction. At the same time,
the large majority of inmates who express concerns of this nature, and
who in fact will express them more as the case winds towards its close,
deeply feel the indignity they express. These inmates probably believe
sincerely that the federal court and the special master would end or at
least diminish the pain. It is arrogant and insupportable for a special
master to ignore these facts, and he does so at his peril.
This may seem an urging that the special master engage in a kind
of precision tight-rope walk, and I must confess there are times, especially
in institutions which in large part are in compliance, that such circus
magic would be of great value. In his dealings with prisoners, especially
as conditions at the institution improve, the special master must be kind
yet critical, and question authority, yet acknowledge its legitimacy. He
must yield gracefully to the termination of his role, with the mixed
feelings of success in the accomplishment of his task, and sadness in
the knowledge that he leaves behind, for all of the reforms he has
witnessed, an institution that in fundamental ways offends one's sensibility.
A final point with respect to prisoner relationships. There is an
enormous difference between working as a special master in a prison
and a jail. Prisoner committees, especially those that achieve a degree
of stability, are invaluable sources of information, trust, and commu-
nication. Of course, creation of such committees generates complications.
These complications are beyond the scope of this Article. I mention
them here, however, merely to point out that the fact of their existence
creates a certain mode of operation for the special master.
Jails, in contrast, typically have populations that are far too transient
for the formation of such a committee. In the absence of such enduring
relationships with prisoners, and the chance to build up a degree of
trust over time, the special master's efforts to unveil constitutional
operations are enormously more complex. The importance of open and
balanced relationships with staff consequently is greatly heightened, as
is the demand placed on the special master's intuition or what have
you, about truths dimly lit and obscurely perceived.
C. The Relationship Between the Special Master and the Judge
Finally regarding obstacles to compliance, the special master must
pay close attention to his relationship with the judge, the judge's
relationship to the order, and the judge's familiarity with the facts and
conditions that make the role of the federal court in cases such as these
legitimate. This is a particularly acute problem in a case when the
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entire action is settled at the start, including the order of reference.
The special master faces a particularly difficult situation when the
remedial order and the appointment of the special master are the part
of the compromise that has taken place before any testimony has been
presented to the judge. Irrespective of the politics of the judge, which
I sincerely believe to be irrelevant, I know no judges who hunger after
the complex, frustrating, and often intractable problems of managing
an institution like a prison. Judges are bound to have personal and
professional concerns about the legitimacy of presiding over the imple-
mentation of the consent decree which, even if carefully drafted and
narrowly focused, is bound to have about it at least an aura of intru-
siveness in an area where, in all likelihood, the judge feels like a stranger
in a very strange land. The special master, especially after learning the
facts of conditions at the institution in question, may have settled in
his own mind the difficult threshold issues with respect to the legitimacy
of federal jurisdiction and the propriety of the remedial order. His
understanding of these issues must be translated at an operative level
to an understanding of the reasons why his name has been attached to
this equitable decree.
The problem I am speaking of can be broken into three components,
related to the judge's unfamiliarity with the case: (1) the facts; (2) the
order; and (3) the nature and scope of the mastership. In each of these
separate, though related respects, the special master bears a heavy
burden--one I believe fundamental to the legitimacy of his role-to
clear the glass through which the judge is looking and to permit him
to see the institution, his order, and the mastership face to face.
Let me consider these three problems in reverse order. First, for a
special master to instruct a judge about the nature of the mastership
is both presumptuous and ineffective. It is more likely that over time,
in the course of daily functioning, the special master will acquaint the
judge as to how this new enterprise works, and how it affects his role.
A judge may have complex reactions to what he perceives to be the
arrogation of his functions by a special master. I do not wish to dwell
on those points. Let me say that I believe a special master will be most
effective if he can keep clearly in mind the difference between an
Article III federal judgeship and a special master, as those differences
create specific limitations on the master's authority to reach legal
conclusions, direct compliance, and enforce orders through coercive
measures.
Second, the judge will come to learn about the nature of his order
and its propriety, through a variety of sources, including perhaps hostile
letters from political constituencies offended by the various luxuries
mandated by the order, and topical and not always accurate stories in
newspapers. The special master cannot control these sources. He can
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ensure, however, that the order and its underlying purposes are not
distorted in their application to prison life. In his communications with
the judge, either orally or through written reports, the special master
must strive always to portray the order in its appropriate context, and
enter findings of fact that are accurate. Also when required, he must
render tentative conclusions of law that are measured and well reasoned.
Finally, acquainting the judge with the facts that legitimize his role
imposes particular difficulties. Let me suggest here one approach to
this difficulty, which at first blush may seem implausible, but which I
have seen work.
If at the outset of litigation, or at any point during the mastership,
the parties come to their senses with sufficient clarity to resolve the
dispute between them on their own, and therefore enter into a consent
decree or stipulation, I believe it is a grave mistake to present that
settlement to the judge, without providing him some familiarity with
the underlying facts that produced that settlement. Although it is
common at the outset of such agreements to include boilerplate language
disclaiming liability and related perfunctory whereases, it also is possible
for the parties to agree on certain facts, and to present an agreed
settlement of facts to the judge.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is possible to go on and on, I suppose, about aspects of compliance
work that are difficult, or about the various places that a discerning
special master can find an "obstacle" to compliance. It is a variation,
I guess, on a Custer complex, at least if you are naive enough at the
start to believe there cannot be many Indians hidden in the valley.
Achieving compliance with the constitutional mandates as they relate
to institutional life is a complex and frequently baffling task. However,
I believe that this task promotes several ideas worthy of pursuit provided
they are discharged faithfully and conscientiously. First, and foremost,
it creates a prison which is safe, lawful, industrious, and hopeful, which
is what we all want prisons to be.3" Second, the special mastership can
facilitate the resolution of disputes outside of court. Plaintiffs and
defendants-named parties and their counsel-know more about the
prison and the case, care more about its resolution, and are more directly
liable to living with the consequences of what they create than any
federal judge, no matter how wise or conscientious. Those facts alone
argue well for a special master, if that mastership is well designed and
faithfully discharged. If we assume for a moment, as I believe we must,
35. J. CONRAD, supra note 30.
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that the appointment of a special master is something within the legit-
imate prerogatives of a federal judge, then I believe in the process.
This process increases the likelihood that constitutional requirements
will be met with the least chance of leaving everyone involved-poli-
ticians, administrators, and prisoners-feeling defeated.
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